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Abstract 
 
In this paper we assess the determinants of revenue forecast errors for the EU-15 
between 1999 and 2012, based on the forecasts published bi-annually by the European 
Commission. Our results show that personal income rate changes increase the revenue 
forecast errors: for forecasts made in t for t, increases in the corporate tax rate implies a 
decrease in the revenue forecast errors, in t+1 and t+2. Moreover, an increase in GDP 
forecast errors decreases revenue errors, whereas an increase in the inflation error will 
increase revenue errors. GDP errors, minority governments, election year and corporate 
tax rate changes can be associated with optimistic revenue forecasts. On the other hand, 
yield, inflation errors and VAT tax rate changes are associated with more prudent 
forecast behaviour. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years there was significant uncertainty regarding macroeconomic forecasts 
made not only by international institutions but also by central governments. This fact 
was visible notably when the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development  (OECD) fiscal outlook, for a wide range of countries, showed that the tax 
revenue was much lower than officially predicted at the beginning of the financial crisis 
in 2008 (Buettner & Kauder, 2010; Golosov & King, 2002). This fact was also recently 
brought to light in the Report of Central Administration Budget Execution for 2012 
elaborated by the Portuguese Court of Auditors (2013), where the recent evolution of 
the value added tax (VAT) raised doubts about the sustainability of forecasts
1
. 
In fact, making precise revenue forecasts is not an easy job. To predict government 
revenues, one needs to take into account a wide set of variables from the most basic 
macroeconomic variables, as gross domestic product (GDP) or inflation, to fiscal 
policy, tax structures, and, perhaps the most difficult one to model, people’s behaviour 
towards uncertainty. 
One of the reasons why the forecasts have a key role in the economy is the 
expectations generated by them. Macroeconomic data may take a few years until it 
become definitive, so in the meanwhile, forecasts are the best existing values and the 
ones taken into account by investors when it comes to evaluate the capability of a 
country to face its responsibilities. Moreover, as identified by Esteves and Braz (2013) 
access to reliable information on the economic situation is fundamental for policy 
makers since the results of their actions depend on the quality of the available 
information. 
In this paper, we study the variables mentioned by the literature as more likely to 
influence the performance of revenue forecast. For that purpose, a panel data set was 
constructed based on the biannual reports made by the European Commission (EC), 
from 2000 spring up to 2013 spring, for the European Union (EU) 15 countries: Austria 
(AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES),  Finland (FI), France 
(FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), 
Portugal (PT), Sweden (SW) and United Kingdom (UK). In addition, a seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) analysis for each country will be performed in order to 
identify possible cross-country differences. 
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 According to the report, the 2012 government budget forecasts an increase of 12.6% of VAT that in 
reality turn out to be a decrease of 2%. 
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Our results show that personal income rate changes increase the revenue forecast 
errors: for forecasts made in t for t, increases in the corporate tax rate implies a decrease 
in the revenue forecast errors, in t+1 and t+2. Moreover, an increase in GDP forecast 
errors decreases revenue errors, whereas an increase in the inflation error will increase 
revenue errors. GDP errors, minority governments, election year and corporate tax rate 
changes can be associated with optimistic revenue forecasts. On the other hand, yield, 
inflation errors and VAT tax rate changes are associated with more prudent forecast 
behaviour.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature about forecast 
errors, mainly on the revenue side. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis. Finally, 
section 4 is the conclusion. 
 
2. Literature review 
In the study of Golosov and King (2002) the main focus concerning forecast errors 
were the ones around the forecast of the GDP growth rate. However, and recognizing 
that having accurate revenue data is fundamental in order to elaborate a good budget, 
countries and authorities have made efforts to obtain reliable numbers for expected 
revenues (Buettner & Kauder, 2010), and so the discussion around this issue has 
increased. Nevertheless, the majority of the existing literature about revenue forecasting 
concerns the USA (Buettner & Kauder, 2010; Golosov & King, 2002). 
On the other hand, it was not the first time that revenue forecast errors was used as 
an attempt to explain a crisis. According to Auerbach (1995) economists were trying to 
explain the ongoing fiscal crisis on the USA by looking at tax changes in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Based on the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) annual budget 
forecasts, the author explained the deviations of revenue using an unusual approach, by 
trying to explain the determinants of technical errors. The results supported the idea that 
overly optimistic revenue forecasts from the 1980s were partially caused by unforeseen 
reactions from taxpayers. 
Indeed, according to Auerbach (1999) and Breuer (2013), uncertainty surrounding 
forecast errors was driven by economic, policy and technical errors. Economic errors 
were associated to unpredicted changes in macroeconomic variables like GDP. Policy 
errors may be caused by changes in the tax rates or in the law, e.g. Finally, technical 
errors are the remaining part and they are frequently connected to various changes that 
were not considered, neither political nor economic. 
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Cimadomo (2011), in his literature survey about real-time data and fiscal policy 
analysis, identified that frequent and sizeable revisions of fiscal data, as well as large 
deviations of fiscal outcomes from the initial forecasts, are factors that endanger the 
EU’s surveillance mechanism. Model uncertainty or unexpected shocks, are pointed out 
as the main reasons for fiscal outcomes deviations’ from government plans. Upcoming 
political elections are also mentioned as possibly inducing over-optimism in fiscal 
projections. 
Buettner and Kauder (2010) studied the performance of revenue forecasts for 12 
OECD countries. They argued that cross-country differences in revenue forecasting 
performance were mainly caused by the uncertainty about macroeconomic variables, 
corporate and personal income tax structures, the elapsed time between the forecast and 
the observation of the variables, and the independence of forecasts from possible 
government manipulation.  
Golosov and King (2002), assessed one year-ahead forecasts of tax revenues in  the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs for a group of low income countries. The 
authors mentioned that the latest studies (at the time) did not found any link between 
forecasting errors and political factors. They also report that underestimates of next 
year’s fiscal deficit would be much more expensive than overestimating by the same 
value. As a consequence, it was suggested that since the fiscal deficit underestimation is 
more expensive then overestimation, the deviation should occur on the cheaper side. In 
the context of an IMF program, major changes to the tax system may take place and 
those changes may introduce additional uncertainty to the forecasts of tax revenues.  
Using data from the annual Stability and Convergence Programs, for the EU-15 
countries, Hagen (2010) studied the deviations between projected and actual outcomes 
for several variables, namely GDP growth, general government budget balance, 
revenues and expenditures relative to GDP. The author found both problems in the 
forecasting performance of the EU country governments and bias and inefficiency 
regarding the projections. As a consequence, Hagen (2010) says that these facts lead us 
to wonder about the capability of governments to carry out accurate forecasts, as well as 
their availability to reveal all the detained information. 
Pina and Venes (2011) studied the general government budget balance forecasts for 
the EU-15 countries, based on the information reported in the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP). They found that forecast errors are sensible to growth surprises, fiscal 
institutions and opportunistic motivations, namely the proximity to an election may 
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induce over-optimistic forecasts. On the contrary, commitment, mix forms of fiscal 
governance and numerical expenditure rules are frequently linked to higher carefulness 
when it comes to forecasts. 
 
Table I – Summary of literature 
Study Data Goal Conclusions 
Cimadomo 
(2011) 
 Literature survey 
about real-time 
data and fiscal 
policy. 
Early estimates are biased values of final values; 
Upcoming elections may induce over-optimism 
projections; model uncertainty or unexpected 
shocks cause fiscal outcomes deviations’ from 
government plans. 
Pina and 
Venes (2011) 
Based on EDP 
for EU-15 
Study the 
determinants of 
EDP forecast 
errors. 
Forecast errors are sensible to growth surprises, 
fiscal institutions and opportunistic motivations; 
proximity to an election may induce over-
optimistic forecasts; Commitment, mix forms of 
fiscal governance and numerical expenditure 
rules are frequently linked to higher carefulness 
Buettner and 
Kauder 
(2010) 
Official tax-
revenue 
forecasts for 
12 OECD 
countries 
Study cross-
country revenue 
forecast 
performance. 
Cross-country differences in revenue 
forecasting caused by: uncertainty around 
macroeconomic variables; tax structures; 
elapsed time between forecast and observation 
of the variables; independence of forecasts 
Hagen (2010) SPG, for the 
EU-15 
countries 
Study the role of 
institutions on 
projection errors. 
Found problems in forecasting performance of 
the EU country governments as well as bias and 
inefficiency on projections 
Leal, Pérez, 
Tujula, and 
Vidal (2008) 
 Access main 
issues and 
challenges about 
fiscal forecasting. 
Worst periods of budget balance projections 
appeared to be more optimistic whereas, 
negative projections emerged in times of good 
budget balances. 
Brück and 
Stephan 
(2006) 
Bi-annual EC 
forecasts from 
1995 to 2003, 
for EU-15, 
USA and 
Japan 
Find political, 
electoral and 
institutional 
determinants of 
budget deficit 
forecasts. 
SGP influences the quality of budget deficit 
forecasts, especially in the period prior to 
elections. 
Golosov and 
King (2002) 
IMF's 
Monitoring of 
Fund 
Arrangements 
database; 45 
countries 
under IMF 
programs 
Study precision of 
revenue forecasts 
for countries 
under an IMF 
program. 
Since fiscal deficit underestimation is more 
expensive then overestimation, deviation should 
occur to the cheaper side 
Auerbach 
(1995) 
OMB forecast 
errors between 
1982-1993 
Explain technical 
forecast errors. 
Overly optimistic revenue forecasts from 1980s 
were partially caused by unforeseen reactions 
from taxpayers. 
 
Brück and Stephan (2006) used the bi-annual forecasts of the EC between 1995 and 
2003 for the EU-15, Japan and USA. Their aim was to explain the deviations in the 
existing budget deficits, using political, electoral, and institutional variables. They 
concluded that the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) influences the quality of budget 
deficit forecasts, especially in the period prior to elections. 
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A literature survey by Leal, Pérez, Tujula, and Vidal (2008) regarding the main 
issues and challenges about fiscal forecasting, finds that in the worst periods budget 
balance projections appeared to be more optimistic whereas, negative projections 
emerged in times of better budget balances. 
Therefore, the literature has already identified possible outcomes for having 
inaccurate forecasts. However, the results seem to vary across time and country. Table I 
summarizes some of the abovementioned main findings. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1 Methodology 
Since we want to address forecast errors, it is essential to enlighten this concept. 
Following the literature (Afonso & Silva, 2012, Hagen, 2010, Pina & Venes, 2011) we 
consider a forecast error the difference between the variable outturn and the variable 
forecast, where i stands for the country and t for the corresponding forecast period, 
(1)                             . 
Thus, positive values for errors are the result of a better than projected performance, 
while a negative value represents an overly optimistic forecast. Note that, it is 
considered as outturn, for period t, the first available estimate published by the EC on 
t+1 (the spring forecast).
2
 
 
3.2 European Commission Forecasts 
In this sub-section we analyse the revenue forecasts of the EC for the EU-15 
countries. Hence, our main data sources are based on the bi-annual reports published by 
the EC, between 1999 spring and 2013 spring. The data were collected for years t, t+1 
and t+2 for GDP growth in volume, for the private consumption price deflator, general 
government total revenue as percentage of GDP, plus the first available estimates for 
these same variables. Subsequently, and using the methodology explained in (1), our 
main variables were constructed, namely the GDP error, inflation error and revenue as a 
percentage of GDP. 
From the Annual Macroeconomic database of the EC (AMECO), we used the 
general government consolidated gross debt (DEBT), the general government balance 
                                               
2
 We follow the reasoning assumed by Brück and Stephan (2006) and Pina and Venes (2011) that the first 
variable’s estimates are the basis for political corrections. Moreover, they allow us to avoid 
methodological revisions. 
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(BAL), and the gap between actual and potential GDP (GAP). The 10-year bond yield is 
taken from Eurostat’s European Monetary Union (EMU) convergence criterion series. 
Standard & Poor's 500 volatility index (VIX) was taken from yahoo finance and used 
later as an instrumental variable. 
Using a political database from Armingeon et al. (2012)
3
, a set of dummies was 
used in order to control for political influences, specifically, coalition governments’ 
(Coalition), legislative elections in the present year (Election year) and minority 
governments composed by one party (Minority Gov). 
The EC has carried out a survey across the member states, in order to assess what 
kind of numerical fiscal rules are used – budget balance, revenue, expense, among 
others. According to the EC, the purpose of these rules is to increase fiscal discipline 
and serve as an instrument for policy coordination between member states, furthermore 
reducing the uncertainty on fiscal policy. Thus, the variable fiscal rule index (FRI) is 
also used in order to check whether such rules have any influence on the revenue 
predictions. 
Finally, in order to capture the uncertainty resulting from the changes in the tax 
rates and in the law, a series of dummies was used. Generally, they assume the value 1 
when a change in the tax rate relative to previous year occurs and 0 in the opposite case. 
Therefore, we can account for changes in VAT rates, changes in the personal income 
tax rate, changes in the corporate tax rate and changes in social security tax rates. Apart 
from these variables, there are also dummies for each of the taxes that indicate whether 
if the observed changed was due to an increase or a decrease of the rate, which allows 
ascertaining more precisely the impact of each change. All these variables were based 
on the OECD Tax Database, except for the VAT.
4
 
Table II shows that changes to personal income rates are the most frequent ones, 
whereas changes to VAT are the less frequent. For instance, there are only two increases 
of corporate tax rates in the sample, contrasting with the high number of increases in 
income tax rates. 
Overall, the main reason for choosing all the above mentioned variables is because 
they are the most used in the literature, not only to study revenue deviations but also in 
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 Data for 2011 was kindly provided by the authors, while the 2012 calculations were based on 
www.parlagov.org/ and on the same methodology. 
4
 European Commission (2013). 
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related studies about other macroeconomic variables, like expenditure, budget deficits, 
GDP.  
 
Table II - Dummy distribution, by tax type, country and direction of change 
 
Corporate tax rate VAT tax rate Income tax rate 
Soc. Security tax 
rate 
Country Δ up down Δ up down Δ up down Δ up down 
AT 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 3 2 1 0 1 
BE 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
DK 3 0 3 0 0 0 10 3 7 2 1 1 
FI 2 0 2 3 3 0 12 2 10 11 7 4 
FR 5 0 5 2 1 1 7 3 4 9 5 4 
DE 4 1 3 1 1 0 7 1 6 14 4 10 
GR 7 0 7 3 3 0 8 2 6 4 4 0 
IE 3 0 3 11 8 3 3 0 3 7 3 4 
IT 4 0 4 1 1 0 6 3 3 1 1 0 
LU 3 1 2 0 0 0 5 2 3 8 4 4 
NL 5 0 5 2 2 0 14 7 7 6 4 2 
PT 2 0 2 5 4 1 6 4 2 0 0 0 
ES 2 0 2 2 2 0 5 2 3 1 0 1 
SW 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 2 1 1 0 
UK 3 0 3 3 2 1 4 2 2 5 3 2 
Total 46 2 44 34 28 6 96 35 61 70 37 33 
Period 
2000 
to 
2012 
2000 
to 
2012 
2000 
to 
2012 
1999 
to 
2012 
1999 
to 
2012 
1999 
to 
2012 
1999 
to 
2012 
1999 
to 
2012 
1999 
to 
2012 
1999 
to 
2012 
1999 
to 
2012 
1999 
to 
2012 
Source: OECD Tax database and authors' calculations.  – number of changes. 
Table III illustrates some of the papers that have used the above described 
variables, or similar ones, in studies related with forecast errors. Thus, using this set of 
variables, which can be classified as economic, political and technical, we assess their 
explanatory power for each of the types of errors associated with the literature for errors 
in revenue forecasts. 
In addition, it is important to stress which components contribute for the general 
government’s total revenue. The EC follows the European System of Accounts 95 
(ESA95) nomenclature
5
. Hence, total revenue is the sum of taxes on production and 
imports (D.2), other subsidies on production (D.39), property income (D.4), current 
taxes on income and wealth (D.5), social contributions (D.61), other current transfers 
(D.7) and capital transfer (D.9).  
 
                                               
5
 See Annex of regulation Nº 1221/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 June 2002 
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Table III – Summary of main variables in previous studies 
Variables used Authors 
GDP forecast error Afonso and Silva (2012); Pina and Venes (2011); Buettner and Kauder (2010); 
Becker and Buettner (2007); Brück and Stephan (2006); Golosov and King (2002) 
Election year Pina and Venes (2011); Hagen (2010); Becker and Buettner (2007); Brück and 
Stephan (2006); Castro, Pérez, and Rodríguez-Vives (2011) 
Inflation error Afonso and Nunes (2013); Afonso and Silva (2012); Golosov and King (2002) 
FRI Afonso and Nunes (2013); Pina and Venes (2011); Hagen (2010) 
Minority Gov Pina and Venes (2011); Brück and Stephan (2006) 
Coalition Pina and Venes (2011); Brück and Stephan (2006) 
BAL Afonso and Nunes (2013) 
DEBT Afonso and Nunes (2013) 
GAP Pina and Venes (2011) 
VIX Afonso and Nunes (2013) 
Tax modifications Auerbach (1995) 
 
As reported in Figure 1, total revenue as a percentage of GDP represents, since 
1999, nearly 45% of GDP for the EU-15, and the highest contributions are given by the 
social security contributions, income and wealth taxes and production and import taxes. 
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Figure 1 - Annual total revenue for EU-15, per category (% of GDP)  
 
Source: AMECO. 
 
Table IV shows the descriptive statistics for our dependent variables, the revenue 
error as a percentage of GDP, for all EU-15 countries. Observing the mean value for the 
EU-15 we conclude that for all periods, the realized revenue has been, on average, 
higher than forecasts, suggesting the existence of ex-ante prudent behaviour. In practice, 
revenue outturn was, on average, 0.15 percentage points higher than forecasted for t, 
0.33 percentage points higher for t+1 and 0.29 percentage points higher for t+2. 
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Table IV – Descriptive statistics for revenue errors (% of GDP) 
Country 
Total revenue error for period 
t 
Total revenue error for period 
t+1 
Total revenue error for period 
t+2 
Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
AT 0.22 0.69 28 0.65 1.32 26 0.58 1.72 12 
BE 0.42 0.73 28 0.81 1.00 26 0.93 1.10 12 
DE 0.19 0.59 28 0.38 1.10 26 0.29 1.29 12 
DK 0.92 1.05 28 1.41 1.38 26 1.83 1.38 12 
ES -0.25 1.04 28 -0.67 1.68 26 -0.90 1.84 12 
FI 0.39 0.89 28 1.22 1.14 26 1.67 1.36 12 
FR 0.05 0.67 28 0.23 1.14 26 0.34 1.49 12 
GR -0.40 2.47 28 -0.15 3.23 26 -0.53 2.55 12 
IE 0.44 1.73 28 0.63 2.22 26 0.53 1.85 12 
IT 0.03 0.66 28 0.40 0.88 26 0.55 0.84 12 
LU -0.05 1.77 28 -0.03 3.01 26 -0.13 3.22 12 
NL 0.07 0.76 28 0.14 1.03 26 0.03 1.21 12 
PT -0.13 1.60 28 -0.46 1.68 26 -0.68 1.56 12 
SE 0.23 1.20 28 0.25 1.44 26 0.10 1.65 12 
UK 0.19 0.81 28 0.15 1.23 26 -0.19 0.96 12 
EU-15 0.15 1.25 420 0.33 1.77 390 0.29 1.80 180 
Source: European Commission. 
 
However, this is not true for all EU-15 countries. Greece, Portugal, Spain and 
Luxembourg exhibit negative mean forecast errors for all the periods, in other words, 
forecast revenues were optimistic. In addition, for Portugal and Spain, the longer is the 
forecasted period, the higher the negative error, on average. This behaviour is not shared 
by Luxembourg and Greece, where t+1 forecasts emerge as the most accurate ones, on 
average. Besides those countries, only the United Kingdom reveals a negative forecast 
mean for t+2. 
 Nevertheless, if we make an average per country for the three periods, the United 
Kingdom emerges as the country with most accurate forecasts, followed by 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. On the opposite side, Denmark, Finland and Belgium 
are the ones with most inaccurate forecasts, even though they all under predict revenue 
(see table A.1, on appendix).  
 
3.3 Panel Estimation 
As a mechanism of the preventive arm of the EU surveillance framework, the EC 
releases spring and autumn forecasts. For the purpose of our work, we use an 
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unbalanced panel data set, with the earlier described variables, from 1999 to 2012, for 
the EU-15 (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom). 
The starting point for the analysis of each year can be represented by the following 
equation: 
(2)                  =    +             +            (  )  + 
              (  )  +         (  )  +                +                 + 
              +                         +                  + 
                +                 +                  + 
                   
where i represents the year-semester of the forecast and t represents the year for which 
the forecast refers. 
For each one of the forecasting horizons’ a baseline model is used, allowing us to 
have comparisons between those years. We have done additional estimations, 
depending on which of the tax change dummies is significant. Regarding robustness, in 
order to make sure that our baseline was the most adequate, we also tried different lags 
and removed variables that decreased the number of observations.  
Following (Afonso & Nunes, 2013), due to possible correlation between DEBT and 
BAL, it was decided not to include both variables at the same time in our model. 
Nonetheless, both equations were tested, and the results were very similar. For this 
reason and since the r-square for the BAL specification was slightly higher, in the 
remaining work we have used this variable. 
All the estimations were made using country fixed effects, creating a dummy that 
will account for all the omitted variables for that country. Moreover, all the equations 
use white diagonal covariance matrix, which consent residual heteroscedasticity 
(Afonso & Nunes, 2013). 
Suspecting the possible existence of endogeneity between the                  and 
the             , we performed the Wu-Hausman endogeneity test. In order to run this 
test, one should start by regressing the suspecting problematic variable on its 
instruments – in this case the ones used were the VIX(-1) and the              (-1),  
and save the residual series. Then, we include residual series in the baseline, creating an 
augmented model. If the p-value of the coefficient of the residual series is higher than 
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0.10 we can reject endogeneity. In this case, we did not found evidence of endogeneity 
evidence in any regression. 
Table V, reports the results using forecasts made in t for t. Three variables emerge 
as the most significant ones. Income rate changes of 1 p.p. lead to an increase, on 
average, of 0.328 p.p. of revenue errors. Also, a 1 p.p. change in the 10-year yield 
results in a 0.07revenue error increase, on average. On the other hand, legislative 
elections taking place in year t have the opposite effect. The existence of an election in 
year t will result in a decrease of revenue error of 0.212 p.p., on average.  
In addition, and knowing that income rate changes lead to higher errors, we 
checked whether these errors were caused by an increase or a decrease in personal 
income tax rates, in columns (5), (6) and (7). However, none of the effects is significant 
when tested individually, column (7) tests for the combined effect. The effects are 
significant at 5 % and both have positive coefficients. Therefore, if the personal income 
rate changes, the revenue error will be higher, for forecasts made in t for t. 
Regarding the estimations reported in Table VI for revenue error estimations made 
in year t for t+1, we observe an increase on the number of significant variables, when 
comparing with the results from Table V. As before, the yield is significant and with a 
similar impact as well as the lagged yield. The election year is again important but now 
with higher significance. On average, the existence of an election in t will result in a 
decrease of the revenue error of 0.934 p.p. in the GDP error on t+1 and in the INF error 
on t+1, and these effects are now significant, which broadly goes into the direction 
pointed by literature.  
An increase of 1 p.p. of the GDP error for the following year will result on average 
in -0.9 p.p. on the revenue error whereas the INF error for t+1 will increase the revenue 
error in 0,424 p.p. Changes to the corporate tax rate are significant in all equations. 
Overall, changes to corporate tax rate will result in a decrease of the revenue error of 
0.378 on average. By controlling for “up” and “down” corporate tax rate dummies’, we 
conclude that decreases in the corporate tax rate in year t, decrease the revenue forecast 
error for the following year, which may hint, for instance, at lower level of tax evasion 
given the reduction in the tax rate.  
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Table V – Total revenue error estimation, for year t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant -0.326 -0.53 -0.418* -0.31 -0.217 -0.244 -0.324 -0.287 
 
(0.269) (0.448) (0.239) (0.244) (0.266) (0.27) (0.268) (0,267) 
Yield 0.07** 0.062* 0.071** 0.077 0.073** 0.071** 0.07**   
 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
 
BAL (-2) 0.027   0.026 0.034* 0.028 0.023 0.028 0.024 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) (0.02) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0,022) 
GAP (-2) -0.021 0.016 -0.017 -0.01 -0.016 -0.013 -0.021 -0.018 
 
(0.032) (0.03) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0,033) 
FRI (-2) -0.106 -0.087     -0.125 -0.1 -0.108 -0.093 
 
(0.116) (0.115) 
  
(0.117) (0.111) (0.116) (0,118) 
GDP error t -0.071 -0.059 -0.069 -0.066 -0.07 -0.07 -0.071 -0.081 
 
(0.102) (0.101) (0.102) (0.095) (0.104) (0.104) (0.102) (0,102) 
INF error t 0.109 0.138 0.116 0.153 0.136 0.15 0.108 0.133 
 
(0.116) (0.114) (0.115) (0.11) (0.113) (0.117) (0.116) (0,117) 
Coalition 0.265 0.256 0.278 0.299 0.224 0.227 0.264 0.24 
 
(0.206) (0.201) (0.202) (0.22) (0.206) (0.207) (0.206) (0,211) 
Minority Gov 0.213 0.216 0.175 0.279 0.156 0.192 0.21 0.2 
 
(0.255) (0.26) (0.248) (0.253) (0.255) (0.25) (0.256) (0,264) 
Election year -0.213* -0.217* -0.205* -0.169 -0.185 -0.219* -0.211* -0.205* 
 
(0.122) (0.122) (0.12) (0.119) (0.123) (0.125) (0.125) (0,124) 
Income rate change 0.328*** 0.316** 0.33***         0.337*** 
 
(0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 
    
(0,127) 
VAT rate change -0.156 -0.225 -0.143   -0.123 -0.109 -0.157 -0.129 
 
(0.164) (0.167) (0.163) 
 
(0.164) (0.166) (0.164) (0,169) 
Corp rate change 0.049 0.066 0.054   0.079 0.085 0.049 0.05 
 
(0.138) (0.141) (0.138) 
 
(0.14) (0.139) (0.138) (0,139) 
Soc. Sec. rate 
change 
0.001 -0.008 0.022   0.015 0.025 0 0.023 
 
(0.157) (0.157) (0.154) 
 
(0.159) (0.158) (0.157) (0,155) 
DEBT (-2)   0.003             
  
(0.006) 
      
Income up         0.213   0.346**   
     
(0.137) 
 
(0.148) 
 
Income down           0.179 0.313**   
      
(0.144) (0.154) 
 
Yield (-1)               0.057* 
        
(0,033) 
R-Square 0.169 0.165 0.168 0.139 0.159 0.157 0.17 0.163 
Endogeneity 0.7864 0.8830 0.7674 0.7080 0.6740 0.7948 0.7728 0.7602 
Cross-sections 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Observations 360 360 360 390 360 360 360 360 
Period 2001-2012 2001-2012 2001-2012 2000-2012 2001-2012 2001-2012 200-2012 2001-2012 
Notes: Coefficients are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Values between parentheses 
stand for the standard errors. Endogeneity represents the p-value taken from Wu-Hausman 
endogeneity test for GDP error t. Cross-sections is the number of included countries. Period 
represents covered years. 
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Table VI - Total revenue error estimation, for year t+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 0.27 -0.667 0.066 -0.087 0.295 0.258 0.284 0.029 
 
(0.345) (0.738) (0.314) (0.308) (0.332) (0.344) 0.344 (0.388) 
Yield 0.136** 0.073 0.131** 0.14*** 0.132** 0.137** 0.134**   
 
(0.059) (0.069) (0.059) (0.051) (0.057) (0.059) 0.059 
 
BAL (-2) 0.04   0.037 0.035 0.031 0.04 0.039 0.044 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 0.031 (0.033) 
GAP (-2) -0.039 0.041 -0.029 -0.05 -0.042 -0.038 -0.04 -0.051 
 
(0.051) (0.045) (0.051) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 0.05 (0.053) 
FRI (-2) -0.263 -0.187     -0.273 -0.259 -0.268 -0.234 
 
(0.229) (0.232) 
  
(0.225) (0.228) 0.23 (0.225) 
GDP error t+1 -0.091** -0.086** -0.089* -0.083* -0.095** -0.09** -0.092** -0.091** 
 
(0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) 0.045 (0.046) 
INF error t+1 0.428*** 0.414*** 0.434*** 0.381*** 0.435*** 0.429*** 0.427*** 0.44*** 
 
(0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.09) (0.087) (0.088) 0.087 (0.088) 
Coalition -0.268 -0.246 -0.231 -0.158 -0.355 -0.272 -0.275 -0.263 
 
(0.279) (0.27) (0.273) (0.294) (0.27) (0.278) 0.279 (0.279) 
Minority Gov -0.007 -0.046 -0.122 0.073** -0.035 -0.011 -0.007 -0.005 
 
(0.391) (0.382) (0.374) (0.417) (0.401) (0.391) 0.392 (0.391) 
Election year -0.954*** -0.96*** -0.926*** -0.765*** -0.993*** -0.951*** -0.962*** -0.96*** 
 
(0.166) (0.167) (0.165) (0.19) (0.167) (0.167) 0.167 (0.167) 
Income rate change -0.047 -0.057 -0.024   -0.102 -0.055 -0.048 -0.049 
 
(0.207) (0.204) (0.21) 
 
(0.205) (0.208) 0.207 (0.207) 
VAT rate change 0.315 0.2 0.386   0.24 0.316 0.305 0.359 
 
(0.279) (0.269) (0.273) 
 
(0.281) (0.277) 0.278 (0.278) 
Corp. rate change -0.383* -0.349* -0.384*         -0.397* 
 
(0.206) (0.206) (0.207) 
    
(0.205) 
Soc. Sec. rate change 0.003 -0.037 0.041   -0.018 -0.01 0.011 0.012 
 
(0.286) (0.281) (0.274) 
 
(0.287) (0.286) 0.286 (0.285) 
DEBT (-2)   0.018             
  
(0.012) 
      
Corp. up         -0.684   -0.756   
     
-1042 
 
1041 
 
Corp. down           -0.351* -0.362*   
       
0.205 
 
Yield (-1)               0.188** 
        
(0.077) 
R-Square 0.314 0.316 0.311 0.218 0.307 0.312 0.315 0.316 
Endogeneity 0.5869 0.7475 0.6596 0.9286 0.6370 0.6206 0.5658 0.8110 
Cross-sections 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Observations 330 330 330 360 330 330 330 330 
Period 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 1999-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 2001-2011 
Notes: Coefficients are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Values between parentheses 
stand for the standard errors. Endogeneity represents the p-value taken from Wu-Hausman endogeneity 
test for GDP error t+1. Cross-section is the number of included countries. Period represents covered 
years. 
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Table VII - Total revenue error estimation, for year t+2 (excluding up and down 
dummies) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
C 0.002 -1.418 -0.161 -0.316 -1.762 
 
-1008 -1862 (0.881) (0.774) (1,889) 
Yield 0.238 0.163 0.235 0.194   
 
(0.194) (0.21) (0.194) (0.164) 
 
BAL (-2) -0.025   -0.03 -0.085 0.027 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.08) (0.073) (0,026) 
GAP (-2) 0.032 0.051 0.039 0.039 0.007 
 
(0.095) (0.075) (0.092) (0.089) (0,092) 
FRI (-2) -0.18 -0.081     -0.065 
 
(0.408) (0.437) 
  
(0,428) 
GDP error t+2 -0.06 -0.063 -0.058 -0.068 -0.069 
 
(0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.066) (0,06) 
INF error t+2 0.18* 0.168 0.181* 0.165* 0.174 
 
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.098) (0,108) 
Coalition -0.82** -0.726 -0.778* -0.557 -0.74 
 
(0.407) (0.45) (0.412) (0.415) (0,46) 
Minority Gov -1.173** -1.169** -1.257** -0.969* -1.213** 
 
(0.574) (0.577) (0.56) (0.57) (0,592) 
Election year 0.011 0.007 0.034 0.026 0.004 
 
(0.303) (0.292) (0.294) (0.282) (0,292) 
Income rate change -0.385 -0.421 -0.36   -0.418 
 
(0.33) (0.334) (0.334) 
 
(0,335) 
VAT rate change 0.768* 0.78* 0.815*   0.811* 
 
(0.436) (0.426) (0.43) 
 
(0,44) 
Corp. rate change -0.611** -0.587* -0.611**   -0.594* 
 
(0.308) (0.316) (0.308) 
 
(0,314) 
Soc. Sec. rate change 0.464 0.478 0.488   0.496 
 
(0.435) (0.433) (0.409) 
 
(0,424) 
DEBT (-2)   0.027       
  
(0.024) 
   
Yield (-1)         0.25 
 
    
(0,218) 
R-Square 0.331 0.337 0.330 0.255 0.341 
Cross-sections 15 15 15 15 15 
Observations 150 150 150 165 150 
Period 2001-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010 2000-2010 2001-2010 
Notes: Coefficients are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Values between parentheses 
stand for the standard errors. Endogeneity represents the p-value taken from Wu-Hausman 
endogeneity test for GDP error t+2. Cross-section is the number of included countries. Period 
represents covered years. 
 
 
  In Table VII we present the results for the 2-years ahead revenue forecasts. In this 
case the yield is not significant anymore but the inflation errors, for t+2, remain 
significant and account for the increase of revenue errors. In what concerns political 
variables, in the presence of a coalition there is a decrease in the revenue errors of about 
0.799 p.p. and a minority government also decrease the forecast errors by 1.156 p.p, on 
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average. In this horizon, two tax changes are statistically significant: the VAT rate 
changes contribute to an increase of revenue errors while corporate tax rate changes 
drive up revenue error decreases’. 
Table VIII allows a better overview of the effects of those rate changes. Estimated 
individually, all the effects are significant but equation (7) discloses that decreases on 
the corporate rate are no longer significant. On the other hand, increases on the 
corporate tax rate reduce the revenue error for t+2 by 1.837 p.p. This is particularly 
surprising because there are only two changes on this variable, one for Germany (2003) 
and another for Luxembourg (2011). From (7) we can also observe that only increases 
to the VAT tax rate implies an increase of revenue errors.  
Therefore, one can conclude that besides GDP and inflation errors, the other 
economic variables do not seem to be directly connected to the revenue forecast errors 
contrasting with institutional and political variables that emerged as the most significant 
determinants explaining the errors. 
Another interesting relation is the one between tax changes and their weight in total 
revenue. Social security contributions are the ones that contribute the most for total 
revenue in the EU-15. However, none of the estimated equations showed statistical 
significance regarding social security rate changes even though there were 
approximately 70 changes in the social security contribution rates, across countries. 
Comparing the results from Tables V, VI and VII with the ones in Table IV – 
concerning the descriptive statistic of revenue errors – we observe that t+1 had the 
higher mean error and it is for the t+1 estimations that one can find more statistically 
significant variables. On the contrary, the mean error for t and t+2 was lower, and we 
also found less significant variables in those estimations. 
For robustness purposes, we used instrumental variables for all t and t+1 equations. 
The results can be found in the appendix (A.2 and A.3) and confirm that using the least 
squares provides, for this specific case, the most efficient results. 
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Table VIII - Total revenue error estimation, for year t+2 (including up and down 
dummies) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
C 0.238 0.023 0.021 -0.027 -0.106 -0.074 -0.055 
 
(0.972) -1002 -1006 (0.874) (0.925) (0.818) (0,816) 
Yield 0.201 0.232 0.239 0.24 0.283 0.258* 0.259* 
 
(0.188) (0.193) (0.194) (0.165) (0.179) (0.154) (0,153) 
BAL (-2) -0.057 -0.025 -0.031 -0.025 -0.067 -0.04 -0.047 
 
(0.086) (0.082) (0.083) (0.079) (0.075) (0.076) (0,077) 
GAP (-2) 0.042 0.03 0.038 0.046 0.057 0.059 0.065 
 
(0.097) (0.095) (0.095) (0.094) (0.093) (0.095) (0,095) 
FRI (-2) -0.196 -0.176 -0.19 -0.029 -0.225 -0.005 -0.015 
 
(0.412) (0.408) (0.41) (0.412) (0.398) (0.414) (0,416) 
GDP error t+2 -0.076 -0.061 -0.061 -0.055 -0.044 -0.049 -0.05 
 
(0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.066) (0.063) (0,063) 
INF error t+2 0.178* 0.18* 0.179* 0.186* 0.189 0.191 0.19 
 
(0.107) (0.105) (0.105) (0.109) (0.117) (0.116) (0,117) 
Coalition -1.065*** -0.844** -0.836** -1.024** -0.841** -1.085*** -1.102*** 
 
(0.383) (0.407) (0.408) (0.417) (0.378) (0.408) (0,409) 
Minority Gov -1.264** -1.185** -1.174** -1.453** -1.12** -1.507** -1.509** 
 
(0.578) (0.575) (0.575) (0.599) (0.541) (0.607) (0,607) 
Election year -0.076 0.01 -0.007 0.01 -0.058 -0.015 -0.033 
 
(0.297) (0.303) (0.303) (0.3) (0.306) (0.301) (0,302) 
Income rate change -0.505 -0.379 -0.422 -0.368 -0.305 -0.334 -0.371 
 
(0.336) (0.333) (0.336) (0.323) (0.334) (0.33) (0,335) 
VAT rate change 0.643 0.768* 0.739*         
 
(0.436) (0.437) (0.436) 
    
Corp. rate change       -0.585* -0.484 -0.532*   
    
(0.3) (0.318) (0.303) 
 
Soc. Sec. rate change 0.402 0.459 0.459 0.601 0.455 0.634 0.629 
 
(0.436) (0.434) (0.436) (0.427) (0.421) (0.428) (0,429) 
DEBT (-2)               
        
Corp. up -1.806***   -1.886***       -1.837*** 
 
(0.639) 
 
(0.653) 
   
(0,647) 
Corp. down   -0.554* -0.565*       -0.485 
  
(0.31) (0.311) 
   
(0,305) 
VAT up       1.312***   1.176** 1.148** 
    
(0.489) 
 
(0.471) (0,471) 
VAT down         -1.5** -1.028* -1.062* 
 
   
 
(0.703) (0.582) (0,587) 
Yield (-1)               
 
   
 
   
R-Square 0.319 0.327 0.335 0.354 0.333 0.360 0.364 
Cross-sections 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
Period 2001-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010 2001-2010 
Notes: Coefficients are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Values between parentheses 
stand for the standard errors. Endogeneity represents the p-value taken from Wu-Hausman 
endogeneity test for GDP error t+2. Cross-section is the number of included countries. Period 
represents covered years 
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3.4 SUR system 
In order to have country specific results, we have run a SUR analysis for year t and 
t+1. Because of the reduced number of observations it was not possible to estimate the 
model for year t+2. Another reason for using this approach is that regardless the 
previous results, is that there are cross-country differences that cannot be unveiled with 
simple panel data. Not all countries are influenced by the same variables and with the 
same intensity. 
The SUR model works by running an estimation for each country but at the same 
time allows for contemporary correlation between the residuals of all equations which is 
more efficient than performing an OLS for each country. For our case, the following 
equation was used:  
(3)                   =    +             +            (  )  + 
               (  )    +                +                  
where i denotes the country and t the year forecasted. 
The reason for using a reduced form of the baseline model is that the SUR does not 
support the use of dummy variables. Moreover, it is also not possible to use the FRI 
since its values are close to a constant over time. In addition, another SUR was 
performed excluding lagged output gap and can be found in the Appendix (A.4 and 
A.5). 
Observing Table IX, the results are slightly different from the previous equations. It 
may be noted that there are more significant negative coefficients, than negative. The 
output GAP is the variable that is more frequently statistically significant. For Denmark, 
France, Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden, as GAP increases, the revenue error seems to 
be reduced, whereas for Spain, Finland and Italy the tendency is to increase, while 
Portugal does not have a single significant variable. The inflation errors affect roughly 
half of the countries. Another result is that, significant GDP errors only contribute to the 
reduction of the revenue errors.  
In addition, GDP and INF are only simultaneously significant for the United 
Kingdom and Luxembourg, and Finland and Luxembourg are the countries with more 
significant variables. 
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Table IX - SUR system per country, for total revenue error as a percentage of 
GDP, for year t 
Country Constant Yield BAL (-2) GAP (-2) 
GDP error 
t 
INF error t R2 Obs. 
AT -0.585 0.193* -0.013 0.085 0.235 0.327** 0.221 26 
 
(0.516) (0.114) (0.065) (0.079) (0.184) (0.158) 
  
BE -0.302 0.251 0.062 -0.158 -0.023 -0.785*** 0.019 26 
 
(0.814) (0.187) (0.09) (0.144) (0.205) (0.298) 
  
DE 0.542* -0.079 0.066 -0.072 0.14 -0.329 0.124 26 
 
(0.316) (0.083) (0.049) (0.06) (0.122) (0.24) 
  
DK -1.292 0.52** 0.218 -0.479** -0.518** -0.226 0.184 26 
 
(0.995) (0.226) (0.17) (0.213) (0.208) (0.444) 
  
ES -0.232 -0.023 -0.007 0.063*** 1.903 -0.286 0.395 26 
 
(0.829) (0.182) (0.071) (0.131) (0.352) (0.274) 
  
FI -0.926* 0.557*** -0.361*** 0.31*** -0.172** 0.165 0.433 26 
 
(0.561) (0.15) (0.054) (0.056) (0.074) (0.171) 
  
FR -0.534 0.314* 0.1 -0.327*** -0.085 -0.607** 0.259 26 
 
(0.962) (0.162) (0.124) (0.122) (0.146) (0.303) 
  
GR 0.229 0.085 0.168** -0.022 0.066 1.057** 0.304 26 
 
(0.679) (0.069) (0.077) (0.107) (0.287) (0.45) 
  
IE 0.911 -0.066 0.069 -0.271** 0.14 0.247 0.119 26 
 
(0.901) (0.206) (0.058) (0.133) (0.121) (0.24) 
  
IT -1.111 0.021 -0.295** 0.198** 0.207 -0.254 0.159 26 
 
(0.93) (0.14) (0.123) (0.085) (0.216) (0.272) 
  
LU 0.603 -0.447** 0.781*** -0.246* -0.323*** 0.487* 0.583 26 
 
(0.646) (0.193) (0.136) (0.132) (0.107) (0.293) 
  
NL -2.652*** 0.588*** -0.191** -0.017 -0.243 -0.864*** 0.096 26 
 
(0.826) (0.187) (0.088) (0.103) (0.15) (0.229) 
  
PT -0.724 0.036 -0.03 -0.081 -0.176 0.531 0.121 26 
 
(0.497) (0.075) (0.098) (0.115) (0.252) (0.329) 
  
SE -1.178** 0.382*** 0.061 -0.247*** -0.775*** 0.224 0.247 26 
 
(0.552) (0.132) (0.09) (0.088) (0.131) (0.256) 
  
UK 0.411 -0.151 -0.058 0.09 -0.806*** -0.336* 0.266 26 
 
(0.854) (0.176) (0.052) (0.093) (0.251) (0.199) 
  
Note: Coefficients are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Values between parentheses stand 
for the standard errors. Obs. represent the number of observations for the specific country 
 
As expected, Table X, regarding the forecasts for t+1, has more significant values 
then the previous one. Also, contrary to Table IX, there are now more positive 
significant coefficients pushing up the revenue error.  
The Netherlands is now the country with more statistically significant variables 
followed by Luxembourg, Spain and Germany. Significant inflation errors’ coefficients 
only display positive signs, resulting in an increase of the revenue error when the 
inflation errors increase as well. For instance, for t+1, Portugal has now yield, BAL and 
GAP as significant variables. An increase in the first two decreases the revenue forecast 
errors whereas an increase in the output GAP increases the errors.  
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Generally, one can conclude that the variables affect countries in different ways. 
Despite that, it is not possible to conclude which coefficients have higher impact on 
revenue errors, if the positive or the negative ones. 
 
Table X - SUR system per country, for total revenue error as a percentage of GDP, 
for year t+1 
Country Constant Yield BAL (-2) GAP (-2) 
GDP error 
t+1 
INF error 
t+1 
R2 Obs. 
AT -1.292 0.161 -0.404*** 0.486*** -0.076 0.824*** 0.448 26 
 
-1.095 (0.257) (0.089) (0.125) (0.105) (0.184) 
  
BE -2.928** 0.951*** -0.083 -0.216 0.261* -0.164 0.056 26 
 
-1.449 (0.364) (0.118) (0.194) (0.149) (0.191) 
  
DE 3.082*** -0.69*** 0.152** -0.335*** -0.216** 0.07 0.494 26 
 
(0.699) (0.175) (0.065) (0.08) (0.084) (0.188) 
  
DK 0.435 0.207 -0.031 -0.138 -0.403*** 0.4 0.208 26 
 
-1.318 (0.302) (0.186) (0.24) (0.125) (0.322) 
  
ES -3.997*** 1.094*** 0.275*** -0.376** 1.069*** -0.23 0.562 26 
 
-1.162 (0.277) (0.093) (0.175) (0.137) (0.168) 
  
FI -1.22 0.71*** -0.283*** 0.26*** -0.013 0.054 0.434 26 
 
(0.786) (0.21) (0.079) (0.076) (0.051) (0.151) 
  
FR 2.069 0.057 0.335 -0.674** 0.158 -0.113 0.468 26 
 
-2.507 (0.373) (0.287) (0.266) (0.131) (0.224) 
  
GR -1.066 0.389*** 0.307** 0.007 -0.116 1.041*** 0.331 26 
 
-1.133 (0.132) (0.143) (0.248) (0.167) (0.283) 
  
IE 3.169*** -0.397** 0.035 -0.39*** 0.33*** -0.108 0.739 26 
 
(0.782) (0.179) (0.05) (0.114) (0.059) (0.094) 
  
IT -1.922* 0.149 -0.471*** 0.245*** 0.029 0.008 0.205 26 
 
(0.938) (0.163) (0.121) (0.086) (0.082) (0.138) 
  
LU -0.102 -0.623** 0.659*** 0.056 -0.776*** 1.644*** 0.796 26 
 
(0.894) (0.252) (0.158) (0.152) (0.085) (0.183) 
  
NL -2.943*** 0.76*** -0.189** 0.396*** 0.243*** 0.291*** 0.642 26 
 
(0.894) (0.215) (0.095) (0.097) (0.081) (0.112) 
  
PT -0.69 -0.731*** -0.803*** 0.342*** 0.076 -0.044 0.499 26 
 
(0.425) (0.084) (0.089) (0.105) (0.104) (0.107) 
  
SE -1.71* 0.443** -0.022 -0.038 -0.137 -0.075 0.241 26 
 
(0.892) (0.204) (0.156) (0.119) (0.087) (0.381) 
  
UK 0.082 -0.096 -0.102 0.055 0.126 0.248 0.164 26 
 
-1.454 (0.297) (0.095) (0.139) (0.141) (0.207) 
  
Note: Coefficients are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Values between parentheses 
stand for the standard errors. Obs. represent the number of observations for the specific country 
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4. Conclusions 
Having in mind that forecasting is a complex task surrounded by huge uncertainty, 
we have tried find the possible determinants of revenue forecasting errors. Therefore, 
we used the EC bi-annual forecasts that were made for the period 1999-2012.  
Our results allow confirm what the literature had previously documented, that is, 
the existence of different sources for revenue errors, namely, economic, political and 
technical. A particular important result is that tax rate changes do affect revenue errors 
and that different tax changes affect differently the revenue errors. If, on the one hand, 
personal income rate changes increase the revenue error, for forecasts made in t for t, 
increases in the corporate tax rate implies a decrease in the revenue forecast errors, in 
t+1 and t+2. We also confirmed that an increase in GDP forecast errors decreases 
revenue errors, whereas an increase in the inflation error will increase revenue errors. 
GDP errors, minority governments, election year and corporate tax rate changes can 
be associated with optimistic revenue forecasts. On the other hand, yield, inflation 
errors and VAT tax rate changes are associated with more prudent forecast behaviour. 
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Appendix 
A.1 – Revenue forecast absolute mean for t, t+1 and t+2, by country 
Country 
3 years 
absolute mean 
Signal 
DK 1.388 + 
FI 1.093 + 
BE 0.718 + 
ES 0.608 - 
IE 0.532 + 
AT 0.483 + 
PT 0.422 - 
GR 0.362 - 
IT 0.326 + 
DE 0.290 + 
FR 0.207 + 
SE 0.192 + 
EU-15 0.142 + 
NL 0.078 + 
LU 0.068 - 
UK 0.047 + 
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A.2 – Total revenue error estimation for year t  
(Instrumental variables) 
  (1) 
Constant -0.284 
 
(0.364) 
Yield 0.063 
 
(0.052) 
Net L&B (-2) 0.03 
 
(0.024) 
Output gap (-2) -0.031 
 
(0.06) 
FRI (-2) -0.113 
 
(0.124) 
GDP error t -0.142 
 
(0.383) 
INF error t 0.103 
 
(0.127) 
Coalition 0.256 
 
(0.213) 
Sing Party Min Gov 0.218 
 
(0.254) 
Election year -0.197 
 
(0.147) 
Income change 0.329*** 
 
(0.126) 
VAT change -0.188 
 
(0.242) 
Corp. change 0.045 
 
(0.137) 
Soc. Sec. change -0.006 
 
(0.161) 
  
R-Square 0.167 
IV GDP Error t (-1) and VIX(-1) 
Cross-sections 15 
Observations 360 
Period 2001-2012 
Note: Coefficients are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Values 
between parentheses stand for the standard errors. Cross-section is the number 
of included countries. Period represents covered years 
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A.3 – Total revenue error estimation for year t+1 
 (Instrumental variables) 
  (1) 
Constant 0.325 
 
(0.35) 
Yield 0.122 
 
(0.067) 
Net L&B (-2) 0.043 
 
(0.031) 
Output gap (-2) -0.051 
 
(0.058) 
FRI (-2) -0.27 
 
(0.229) 
GDP error t+1 -0.134 
 
(0.114) 
INF error t+1 0.453*** 
 
(0.11) 
Coalition -0.291 
 
(0.281) 
Sing Party Min Gov -0.004 
 
(0.397) 
Election year -0.966*** 
 
(0.169) 
Income change -0.061 
 
(0.209) 
VAT change 0.293 
 
(0.297) 
Corp. change -0.377* 
 
(0.207) 
Soc. Sec. change 0.024 
 
(0.294) 
  
R-Square 0.312 
IV GDP Error t+1 (-1) and VIX(-1) 
Cross-sections 15 
Observations 330 
Period 2001-2011 
Note: Coefficients are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Values 
between parentheses stand for the standard errors. Cross-section is the 
number of included countries. Period represents covered years 
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A.4 - SUR system per country, for total revenue error as a percentage of GDP, for 
year t 
Country Constant Yield Net L&B (-2) GDP error t INF error t R2 Obs. 
AT -0.397 0.181* 0.052 0.283 0.284* 0.143 26 
 
(0.497) (0.105) (0.06) (0.178) (0.163) 
  
BE 0.012 0.102 -0.019 -0.038 -0.167 0.02 26 
 
(0.828) (0.189) (0.076) (0.215) (0.315) 
  
DE 0.534* -0.1 0.028 0.224* -0.467* 0.101 26 
 
(0.31) (0.08) (0.037) (0.123) (0.238) 
  
DK 0.695 0.112 -0.134** -0.268 -0.491 0.15 26 
 
(0.622) (0.159) (0.065) (0.214) (0.468) 
  
ES -0.232 0.002 0.037 1.755*** -0.209 0.394 26 
 
(0.826) (0.188) (0.036) (0.358) (0.276) 
  
FI -1.213* 0.475** -0.079 -0.254*** 0.245 0.243 26 
 
(0.668) (0.189) (0.058) (0.098) (0.302) 
  
FR -1.751** 0.29* -0.186*** 0.074 -0.159 0.107 26 
 
(0.791) (0.149) (0.069) (0.145) (0.298) 
  
GR 0.154 0.083* 0.157** -0.135 0.825* 0.278 26 
 
(0.618) (0.049) (0.077) (0.291) (0.475) 
  
IE 1.092 -0.206 -0.015 0.228* 0.089 0.107 26 
 
(0.868) (0.183) (0.038) (0.116) (0.23) 
  
IT 0.53 -0.099 0.009 0.107 -0.049 0.052 26 
 
(0.795) (0.141) (0.096) (0.225) (0.288) 
  
LU 0.853 -0.446** 0.549*** -0.309*** 0.18 0.559 26 
 
(0.678) (0.203) (0.086) (0.118) (0.286) 
  
NL -2.232*** 0.497*** -0.171** -0.195 -0.685*** 0.115 26 
 
(0.817) (0.183) (0.077) (0.142) (0.225) 
  
PT -0.824* 0.05 -0.034 -0.22 0.364 0.105 26 
 
(0.472) (0.066) (0.084) (0.242) (0.305) 
  
SE -0.925* 0.375*** -0.181** -0.535*** -0.059 0.218 26 
 
(0.532) (0.128) (0.088) (0.143) (0.313) 
  
UK -0.086 -0.031 -0.065 -0.789*** -0.47** 0.289 26 
  (0.819) (0.162) (0.05) (0.25) (0.19)     
Note: Coefficients are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Values between parentheses 
stand for the standard errors. Obs. represent the number of observations for the specific country 
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A.5 - SUR system per country, for total revenue error as a percentage of GDP, for 
year t+1 
Country Constant Yield Net L&B (-2) GDP error t INF error t R2 Obs. 
AT -2.648** 0.632** -0.198** -0.111 0.311 0.288 24 
 
(1.17) (0.262) (0.091) (0.112) (0.191) 
  
BE -1.965 0.624** -0.196** 0.11 -0.019 0.044 24 
 
-1.326 (0.315) (0.087) (0.133) (0.153) 
  
DE 2.902*** -0.773*** -0.087 -0.221** 0.27 0.292 24 
 
(0.828) (0.205) (0.073) (0.099) (0.252) 
  
DK 0.762 0.148 -0.171*** -0.432*** 0.596** 0.206 24 
 
(0.887) (0.214) (0.065) (0.109) (0.273) 
  
ES -3.778*** 0.909*** 0.047 1.042*** -0.303* 0.539 24 
 
-1.221 (0.29) (0.045) (0.133) (0.178) 
  
FI -1.57* 0.649*** -0.041 -0.065 0.017 0.306 24 
 
(0.801) (0.221) (0.06) (0.047) (0.178) 
  
FR -4.304*** 0.777*** -0.412*** 0.183 0.197 0.32 24 
 
-1.439 (0.289) (0.106) (0.115) (0.195) 
  
GR -0.731 0.403*** 0.331*** 0.032 1.011*** 0.325 24 
 
(0.936) (0.073) (0.123) (0.132) (0.258) 
  
IE 4.428*** -0.789*** -0.126*** 0.356*** 0.032 0.65 24 
 
(0.79) (0.165) (0.034) (0.063) (0.091) 
  
IT 0.349 -0.059 -0.131 0.018 -0.099 0.142 24 
 
(0.967) (0.188) (0.104) (0.092) (0.164) 
  
LU 0.109 -0.756*** 0.855*** -0.742*** 1.672*** 0.793 24 
 
(0.95) (0.272) (0.101) (0.087) (0.184) 
  
NL -1.342 0.38 0.146* -0.014 0.421*** 0.527 24 
 
-1.075 (0.259) (0.076) (0.087) (0.133) 
  
PT -0.225 -0.568*** -0.541*** -0.003 0.052 0.442 24 
 
(0.43) (0.07) (0.072) (0.096) (0.1) 
  
SE -1.636 0.437** -0.099 -0.196** -0.099 0.242 24 
 
(0.784) (0.182) (0.106) (0.077) (0.327) 
  
UK -1.702 0.271 -0.168** 0.111 0.225 0.159 24 
  -1.358 (0.279) (0.077) (0.127) (0.191)     
Note: Coefficients are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Values between parentheses stand 
for the standard errors. Obs. represent the number of observations for the specific country 
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Data and sources 
 
Coalition 
Description: dummy variable that assumes value 1 if the country government is 
composed of more than one party in year t and 0 for other cases. It includes both surplus 
and minority coalitions. 
Data source: Comparative Political Data Set I (1999-2011) & http://www.parlgov.org/ 
(2012). 
 
Corporate rate change 
Description: dummy variable that assumes value 1 if a change in corporate rate occurred 
in year t and 0 for other cases. Note that, in this case it is considered the current rate, 
which may include temporary surtaxes. 
Data source: computed based on OECD Tax Database. 
 
Corporate rate down 
Description: dummy variable that assumes value 1 if a decrease in corporate rate 
occurred in year t and 0 for other cases. Note that, in this case it is considered the 
current rate, which may include temporary surtaxes. 
Data source: computed based on OECD Tax Database. 
 
Corporate rate up 
Description: dummy variable that assumes value 1 if an increase in corporate rate 
occurred in year t and 0 for other cases. Note that, in this case it is considered the 
current rate, which may include temporary surtaxes. 
Data source: computed based on OECD Tax Database. 
 
Election year 
Description: dummy variable that assumes value 1 if there is an legislative election in in 
year t and 0 for other cases. 
Data source: Comparative Political Data Set I (1999-2011) & http://www.parlgov.org/ 
(2012). 
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Fiscal Rule Index 
Description: based on an EC in questionnaire it is a database on numerical fiscal rules 
Data source: EC (1990-2011). 
 
General government net lending or net borrowing 
Description: describes general government's budgetary deficit or surplus. 
Data source: AMECO (1999-2012). 
 
General government total revenue error 
Description: revenue error for period t is the result of the difference between the first 
total government revenue, as a percentage of GDP, estimate released by the EC in t+1 
Spring, for year t, and the forecasted total revenue for period t. 
Data source: European Commission (Autumn 1999 - Spring 2013). 
 
Gross domestic product error 
Description: GDP error for period t is the result of the difference between the first GDP 
growth rate, in volume and as a percentage change from previous year, estimate 
released by the EC in t+1 Spring, for year t, and the forecasted GDP growth rate for 
period t. 
Data source: European Commission (Autumn 1999 - Spring 2013). 
 
Inflation error 
Description: inflation error for period t is the result of the difference between the first 
price deflator of private consumption, as a percentage change from previous year, 
estimate released by the European Commission in t+1 Spring for year t and the 
forecasted price deflator of private consumption for period t. 
Data source: European Commission (Autumn 1999 - Spring 2013) 
 
Output gap 
Description: refers to the gap between actual and potential gross domestic product, at 
2005 market prices 
Data source: AMECO (1999-2012). 
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Personal income rate change  
Description: dummy variable that assumes value 1 if a change in (at least) one personal 
income rate occurred in year t and 0 for other cases. Note that, for this case there are 
different threshold levels with different taxations. 
Data source: computed based on OECD Tax Database. 
 
Personal income rate down 
Description: dummy variable that assumes value 1 if a decrease in personal income rate 
occurred in year t and 0 for other cases. Note that, for this case there are different 
threshold levels with different taxations. If for a given year, more than one threshold 
change, a mean for all the thresholds is computed; if the mean decreases, it is 
considered that a decrease in personal income rate as occur, and so the variable assumes 
the value 1. Also, the creation of a lower personal income rate is also considered a 
decrease. 
Data source: computed based on OECD Tax Database. 
 
Personal income rate up 
Description: dummy variable that assumes value 1 if an increase in personal income rate 
occurred in year t and 0 for other cases. Note that, for this case there are different 
threshold levels with different taxations. If for a given year, more than one threshold 
change, a mean for all the thresholds is computed; if the mean increases, it is considered 
that an increase in personal income rate as occur, and so the variable assumes the value 
1. Also, the creation of a higher personal income rate is also considered an increase. 
Data source: computed based on OECD Tax Database. 
 
Public Debt 
Description: this variable represents the general government consolidated gross debt, 
taken from EDP, and therefore based on ESA 1995, as percentage of GDP at market 
prices. 
Data source: AMECO (1999-2012). 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
Single party minority government 
Description: dummy variable that assumes value 1 if the party in government does not 
own a majority in parliament in year t and 0 for other cases. 
Data source: Comparative Political Data Set I (1999-2011) & http://www.parlgov.org/ 
(2012). 
 
Social Security rate change 
Description: dummy variable that assumes value 1 if a change in social security rate 
occurred in year t and 0 for other cases. 
Data source: computed based on OECD Tax Database. 
 
Social Security rate down 
Description: dummy variable that assumes value 1 if a decrease in social security rate 
occurred in year t and 0 for other cases. 
Data source: computed based on OECD Tax Database. 
 
Social Security rate up 
Description: dummy variable that assumes value 1 if an increase in social security rate 
occurred in year t and 0 for other cases. 
Data source: computed based on OECD Tax Database. 
 
VAT rate change 
Description: dummy variable that assumes value 1 if a change in VAT rates occurred in 
year t and 0 for other cases. Note that, for this case there are different kinds of tax 
levels: reduced, standard, increased and parking rates. If for a given year, more than one 
tax change, a mean for this four rates is computed; if the mean increases, the variable 
assume value 1. 
Data source: computed based on OECD Tax Database. 
 
VAR rate down 
Description: dummy variable that assumes value 1 if a decrease in VAT rates occurred 
in year t and 0 for other cases. Note that, for this case there are different kinds of tax 
levels: reduced, standard, increased and parking rates. If for a given year, more than one 
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tax change, a mean for this four rates is computed; if the mean decreases, it is 
considered that a decrease in VAT rate as occur, and so the variable assumes the value 
1. Also, the creation of a lower VAT rate is also considered a decrease. 
Data source: Computed based on OECD Tax Database. 
 
VAT rate up 
Description: dummy variable that assumes value 1 if an increase in VAT rates occurred 
in year t and 0 for other cases. Note that, for this case there are different kinds of tax 
levels: reduced, standard, increased and parking rates. If for a given year, more than one 
tax change, a mean for this four rates is computed; if the mean increases, it is considered 
that an increase in VAT rate as occur, and so the variable assumes the value 1. Also, the 
creation of a higher VAT rate is also considered an increase. 
Data source: computed based on OECD Tax Database. 
 
VIX 
Description: Standard and Poor’s 500 volatility index, taken from June and December 
of each year. 
Data source: Yahoo finance (1999-2011). 
 
Yield 
Description: this variable follows the European Monetary Union (EMU) convergence 
criterion bond yields. For the purpose of this work, bi-annual data was taken, from June 
and December of each year. By doing this, it is expected to reflect all the available 
information known by the forecaster at the time. 
Data source: Eurostat (June 1999 to December 2012). 
 
 
